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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through ) 
Department of Social Services ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent ) 
vs ) 
DAVID R. PETERS ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, 
District Court Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
Respondent is satisfied with Appellant's rendition of the 
statement of the case with the exception of the concluding two 
paragraphs found on Page 3 of Appellant's Brief. At the March 8 
hearing on Peters' Motion to Set \Aside the Judgment, evidence was 
presented to the Court which consisted of an Affidavit of the 
landlord from whom Peters had rented the property located at 1504 
East 1700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Tr. 22) The Affidavit of the 
landlord indicated that he was familiar with David R. Peters and 
STATE OF UTAH 
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that to the knowledge of the landlord, David R. Peters had resided 
at the rental property continuously from the 6th of June, 1981 until 
November 19, 1984. Further evidence was introduced to the Court 
which consisted of photo copies of Peters 1 unemployment compensation 
checks for each week during the month of September, 1984. (Tr. 
23-24) Those checks showed that they had been mailed to Peters at 
the 1504 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City address and had been 
endorsed by Peters at a Salt Lake City market with Peters 
identifying his address as 1504 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Such evidence was received by the Court pursuant to the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Defendant was afforded an opportunity to present 
his evidence and refute any evidence produced by the State of Utah 
relative to Peters 1 Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment which 
was before the District Court. 
Peters 1 Statement of the Case found on Page 3 of his Brief 
does not contain any rendition of fact relative to the case on 
appeal but constitutes a plea by Peters to give him an opportunity 
to attempt to resolve the issue of paternity. Peters 1 final sentence 
reads "Peters submits the parties ar.e at least entitled to have the 
benefit of blood and tissue test performed and considered which have 
not been done because of the Court's denial of his Motion." Yet the 
past continuances granted by this Court have been based upon the 
representation of Peters to submit to serological tests to assist in 
resolving the issue of paternity and from Peters 1 point of view make 
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this appeal moot. As evidenced by Exhibit "A11 attached to his Brief, 
since the 25th day of October, 1985, the State of Utah has been 
willing and has attempted to schedule such serological tests to 
assist in resolving this case. However, Peters has failed to take 
the opportunity of submitting to such serological tests. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON PETERS WAS PROPER PURSUANT TO THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Service of the Summons and Complaint upon Peters was effected 
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant's failure 
to respond to the Complaint and Summons served upon him, within the 
requisite period of time, permitted the trial court to enter a 
default against Peters. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT PETERS 1 MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and case law of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set 
aside the Default Judgment entered against Peters. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON PETERS WAS PROPER PURSUANT TO THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) provides as follows: 
"Personal service within the State shall be as follows: 
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of fourteen (14) years 
of age or over, by delivering a copy thereof to him 
personally, or be leaving such copy at his usual place of 
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there 
residing; or be delivering a copy to an agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process." 
Peters contends that because he did not receive the Summons himself, 
at the time of service by the constable, there has been no personal 
service upon him. However, Peters 1 arguments overlooks the specific 
provisions of Rule 4 ( e ) . The return of service of the constable 
indictes that the Summons and Complaint were left with "Adam 
Trujillo, roommate." Peters makes no contention that this Adam 
Trujillo was not a "person of suitable age and discretion there 
residing." Peters 1 attempts to affront the State's compliance with 
the provisions of Rule 4(e) by his Affidavit that on or about the 
6th of September, he was living in Vernal, Utah. However, at the 
time appointed for the hearing and the presentation of evidence to 
support Peters 1 Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment, the trial 
court determined that based upon the evidence presented, the service 
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was proper. Peters presented no evidence to refute the Affidavit of 
his landlord indicating that Peters had resided and lived at the 
1504 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah address. Nor did Peters 
present any evidence to explain why unemployment compensation checks 
for the entire month of September, 1984, were mailed to him at the 
1504 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah address and were received 
by Peters and endorsed by Peters with his endorsement indicating 
that his address was 1504 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Peters sole, Ex Parte Affidavit was not sufficient to support his 
Motion attacking the sufficiency of service, c. f., Verdenbrugh et 
al vs Weidmann et al, 183 A.459(New Jersey 1936) ("the proper 
practice to support motions...of this character in courts of law, 
is...not by ex parte affidavits, as was done in this case." ibid., 
4 6 0 ) . 
"...[W]hen notice is a person's aue, process which is a 
mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be 
such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might 
reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and 
hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be 
defended on the grounds that it is in itself reasonably 
certain to inform those affected..., or, where conditions do 
not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not 
substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of. 
the feasible uncustomary substitutes." (Citations ommitted). 
Mullane vs Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 US306, 315, 
70 S.Ct. 652, 658, 94 L. Ed. 865, 875 (1950). 
Peters failed to explain why he was able to receive his unemployment 
compensation checks at the 1504 East 1700 address but was unable to 
receive the Summons and Complaint at the same address. 
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When the time came for hearing upon Peters 1 Rule 60(b) motion 
(which can only be construed as having a basis pursuant to 
subsection (4) of that Rule, dealing with the issue of personal 
service of the Summons) Peters failed to produce sufficient evidence 
for the trial court to belief that the State had failed to comply 
with personal service requirements of Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Peters attempts to contend that the Return of Service filed 
with the Court on the 13th day of September, 1984, after affecting 
service on the 6th of September, 1984, was untimely pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 4(g) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 4(g) 
provides that the proof of service must be made within 5 days after 
service of process. Peters ignores, however, the provisions of Rule 
6 ( a ) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides "When the period 
of time prescribed or allowed is less than 7 days, intermediate 
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the 
computation." Peters was served on the 6th day of Septeber, 1984, 
thus the computation of the 5 days begins with the 7th day of 
September, 1984. However, the 8th aYid 9th days of September, 1984, 
were Saturday and Sunday, respectively. Thus, the remaining four 
days of the 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th of September, constitute a 
total period of five (5) days and the proof of servicve was filed 
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with the Court within the 5-day provision required by Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4 ( g ) . As Peters was personally served, as provided 
by Rule 4 ( e ) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure* and the proof of 
service was filed within the requisite period required by Rule 4 ( g ) , 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Peters failed to file his Answer 
to the Complaint served upon him, his Default was properly entered 
by the District Court the 4th day October, 1984; 8 days further than 
the 20 days prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Peters 1 attempts to avoid the 3-month time period for filing 
his 60(b) motion, based upon the allegation of improper service, by 
alleging that the Default Judgment entered by the District Court was 
void. However, nothing in Peters 1 Affidavit submitted to support his 
Motion nor any allegation contained in the 60(b) motion itself, can 
be construed to constitute a basis other than personal service was 
not obtained upon Peters. Even though his Motion was untimely, the 
District Court went ahead and held hearing upon Peters 1 Motion. At 
the time set by the District Court for Peters to support his Motion, 
Peters failed to establish that his 60(b) Motion had merit. 
Dissatisfied with his inability in the appropriate form to establish 
the merits of his case, Peters now seeks another opportunity before 
this Court. Such is an inappropriate forum and method. Bennion vs 
Hansen, 7 Utah Adv. Rep 37 (April, 1 9 8 5 ) . 
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT PETERS 1 MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
As Appellant conceeds, the trial court is vested with 
considerable discretion in reviewing the merits as to whether or not 
a Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment needs to be granted, and 
that the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed on apppeal 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. The ruling by the trial court is 
based upon its review of why a party failed to answer, not with the 
merits of any defense he might offer. Board of Education of Granite 
School District vs Cox, 14 U2d 385, 384, P2d 806 (1963) cited with 
approval in Airkem Intermountain, Inc., vs Parker, 30 U2d 65, 513 
P2d 429 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . As Peters was unable to comply with clear import of 
past Utah Supreme Court decisions which state that the trial court 
is awarded broad discretion in ruling on relief from a judgment and 
that this Court will not reverse that ruling unless it is clear that 
the trial court has abused that discretion, (see, eg., Russel vs 
Martell , 681 P2d 1193 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) ) , Peters' attempts to color the 
issue by positing that a different
 %standard applies to a default 
paternity action. The cases cited by Peters in this vein of his 
argument belie the actual circumstances of this case. The Default 
Judgment entered against Peters deals only with the issue of 
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paternity. The trial court failed to enter any provisions relative 
to support or past support for the child. Thus for Peters to argue 
that the immediate concern was relative to financial aspects is in 
error. Peters 1 argument also conflicts with his actual behavior in 
his refusal to submit to serological test during the past 120 days 
when extensions were granted in this appeal to attempt to affect 
such serological tests for the benefit of Peters 1 argument. As ewery 
extension has been granted in this appeal, Peters has continued to 
refuse to cooperate with his counsel and appear for the blood tests 
he claims he desires. In this case, Peters' actions speak much 
louder than the words of his appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits to this Court that the ruling and order of 
the trial court is appropriate and that this Court should deny 
Peters 1 appeal for reversal and remand. 
DATED this &f day of January, 1986. 
DAVID 
MA 
The foregoing was mailed to Benjam 
400 South, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 
day of January, 1986, and to Thorn D. Roberts. 
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